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Three years after the controversial 2010 electoral reform package waspassed by the city’s legislature, Hong Kong again stands at a criticaljuncture in the struggle for universal suffrage toward realising full
democracy. In Article 45 of the Basic Law, the city’s constitution, the selec-
tion of the chief executive by universal suffrage is stated as the “ultimate
aim.” However, the same article also stipulates that the selection method
shall be specified “in light of the actual situation” and “in accordance with
the principle of gradual and orderly progress.” (1) Democrats had hoped for
the introduction of universal suffrage as soon as 1997, but Article 6 of
Annex I to the Basic Law stipulates that the first chief executive shall be
selected in accordance with the Decision of the National People’s Congress
(NPC). (2) Because Article 6 only makes specification for the first chief ex-
ecutive, and Article 7 of the same Annex makes provisions for future amend-
ments, the two clauses have been interpreted by democrats as containing
the implicit promise that after the first administration, universal suffrage
would be introduced as early as 2007. A heavy blow was dealt to such as-
pirations by Beijing in April 2004, when the NPC Standing Committee voted
to rule out universal suffrage for the chief executive election in 2007. (3)
Three years later, it further ruled out universal suffrage for the 2012 election.
It was determined at the same session, however, that the election of the
fifth chief executive in 2017 “may be implemented by the method of uni-
versal suffrage,” and that after this all members of the Legislative Council
may be elected by universal suffrage. (4) All attention is thus on the current
administration, headed by Leung Chun-ying, to launch the reform process
toward delivering the first democratically elected chief of the city.As of
summer 2013, however, there has been little sign that the leadership intends
to commence consultation. The future chief executive, according to the
Basic Law, will be elected from a pool of candidates nominated by a “broadly
representative” nominating committee (timing weiyuanhui 提名委員會).
Although the exact composition of the committee has yet to be decided, it
is believed that Beijing will push for a makeup similar to that of the existing
Election Committee (xuanju weiyuanhui 選舉委員會), which includes dis-
trict representatives and lawmakers. Amendments to the Electoral Affairs
Commission Ordinance will need to be enacted at least 12 months ahead,
and allowing time also for any proposed reform package to be passed
through the Legislative Council decisions must be made no later than the
final quarter of 2014. (5) Hence, there is urgent need to begin consultation
and negotiation as soon as possible. The 1 July march, an annual rally led
by the Civil Human Rights Front since the handover, saw a record number
of participants since 2004 taking to the streets clamouring for the speedy
implementation of democratic reform.
This essay will focus on one social movement that has grown out of this
context of disillusionment and growing sense of urgency. “Occupy Central”
(zhanling zhonghuan 佔領中環), as it has come to be known, is conceived
by Benny Tai Yiu-ting, a moderate law professor, as a last resort strategy to
force Beijing to fulfil its promise of democracy. Although it shares the name
of the Occupy Wall Street movement in New York, the current campaign
fights for something rather different. Section one examines the latest debate
on electoral reform in Hong Kong. Section two demonstrates how Occupy
Central presents a unique case study in the recent history of social move-
ments in the Special Administrative Region (SAR). The following two sec-
tions analyse reactions to the movement and seek to answer why Occupy
Central, noting how it has not only become the focus of attacks from pro-
Beijing groups but has also led certain members of the pan-democratic
camp to question its viability.
Contending versions of democracy
Following the NPC Standing Committee’s 2007 resolution that Hong Kong
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may elect its own chief executive in 2017 through universal suffrage, the de-
bate has turned to the actual mechanisms by which the city’s next head will
be chosen. The overwhelming number of blank votes (54.6%) cast at the mock
vote formally known as the 3.23 Civil Referendum Project, held by the Public
Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong on the three official can-
didates ahead of the 2012 chief executive election, certainly made the central
government nervous about the prospect of introducing popular elections in
the SAR with a limited pool of vetted candidates. (6)Testing the waters, Politburo
Standing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng was the first high-level figure to
remark that the SAR chief executive must love China and love Hong Kong 
(ai guo ai Gang 愛國愛港). He warned of the growing power of “subversive”
forces in the territory, fearing that Hong Kong may “become a base and the
bridgehead from which to subvert the socialist system in the mainland.” (7)Yu’s
remarks were reiterated days later by Central Liaison Office director Zhang Xi-
aoming, who added that the future chief executive must be trusted by the
central government (huo zhongyang xinren 獲中央信任) and that there must
be a filtering mechanism (shaixuan 篩選) to ensure that a person who opposes
(butuo, duili de ren 不妥、對立的人) Beijing will not be elected. (8) These re-
marks raised fears that the central government intends to screen out undesir-
able candidates before citizens get the chance to vote.
The bone of contention focuses on the provision in Article 45 that the chief
executive shall be elected by universal suffrage “upon nomination by a broadly
representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic proce-
dures.” For the pan-democrats, the formation of this nominating committee
must itself follow strict democratic procedures. Different groups within the
camp have come up with their own proposals. The most representative thus
far is that put forward by the Alliance for True Democracy (zhenpuxuan lian-
meng 真普選聯盟), a coalition formed in March 2013 joining 27 legislators
from 12 political groups. (9) In its Initial Views for Consultation announced in
May, the Alliance suggested that nominating committee members should be
elected by all 3.2 million registered voters on a “one person, one vote” (yiren
yipiao 一人一票) basis. (10) In early July, the Scholar Panel of the Alliance, which
gathers a group of academics including convenor Joseph Cheng and Chinese
University politics professor Ma Ngok, formally announced proposals for uni-
versal suffrage in the 2017 chief executive election. (11) They came up with
three plans with regard to the composition of the nominating committee: 
• The first is to add 400 democratically elected district councillors to the
1,200 members that will be formed along the lines of the current Elec-
tion Committee. Minus the seats in the Election Committee elected by
district councillors, the new nominating committee will have around
1,500 members. 
• The second is to have a 400-member directly elected nominating com-
mittee, to be elected by all voters registered in geographical constituen-
cies by proportional representation. 
• The third is to have a 500-member nominating committee made up of
all district councillors elected in 2015 and legislative councillors elected
in 2016. 
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(Alliance for True Democracy put forward three electoral proposals), Sing Tao Daily, 10 July 2013.
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Proposal Composition of nominating committee Nomination procedure
A
1,500-member committee with the addition of
district councillors to the 1,200-member Election
Committee
Secure the support of no fewer than one tenth of
nominating committee members;
OR
Obtain the written endorsement of at least 2% of
registered voters in geographical elections
B 400-member committee elected by voters in 20 constituencies
Secure the support of no fewer than one tenth of
nominating committee members
C 500-member committee made up of all legislators and district councillors
Secure the support of no fewer than one tenth of
nominating committee members;
OR
Obtain the written endorsement of at least 2% of
registered voters in geographical elections
Source: Official Facebook page of the Alliance for True Democracy.
Table 1 – Proposals for the formation of the nominating committee for the 2017 chief executive election
announced by the Alliance for True Democracy on 10 July 2013
For the nomination procedure, under all three proposals any candidate
who has secured the support of no less than one tenth of nominating com-
mittee members can gain an entry ticket to run in the final popular election.
For the first and third proposals, however, because committee members are
not all directly elected by all voters, an alternative qualifying route to the
final race is to obtain the written endorsement of 2% of the voting popu-
lation, or about 70,000 to 80,000 voters. This additional channel will respect
ordinary voters’ right to nominate and ensure that candidates with reason-
able public support can enter the race. (12) For the final popular election, the
Scholar Panel recommends the adoption of a “two-round run-off” system.
In the long run, the Alliance wants the nominating committee scrapped and
the chief executive elected directly by all voters.
The recommendation by the Alliance is the most comprehensive to have
emerged from the pan-democrats thus far and the one that has obtained
the most consensual support within the camp. Based on the above three
proposals, various pan-democratic parties will now consult public opinion
before consolidating one concrete proposal to be announced by the end of
2013. Meanwhile, a few other pro-democracy groups have also put forward
proposals, some of which suggest that the committee should be made up
of all 3.2 million voters citywide, and that anyone who has collected 50,000
(People Power) or 100,000 (Scholarism) endorsements should be eligible to
become a candidate. (13)
The Alliance’s so-called “2% route” of joint endorsement has already
drawn criticism from Beijing-loyalist lawmakers (14) such as Regina Ip (15) and
Elsie Leung, deputy director of the Basic Law Committee. (16) Michael Tien,
a local deputy to the NPC, said that an election without a screening mech-
anism could lead to the “ludicrous” situation of 10,000 people running for
the post. (17) Instead, the pro-establishment camp voiced support for the
idea of introducing a preliminary election within the nominating commit-
tee (18) to decide which candidates can go forward to the final race. In other
words, candidates considered unfavourable to Beijing may face two barriers
before they can proceed to the popular vote: they must first secure a certain
number of nominations from within the committee, and then survive the
internal vote. Given that pro-Beijing members will likely dominate the future
nominating committee, as is the case in the extant Election Committee, it
is possible that candidates from the pro-democracy camp could be screened
out before the final poll. The pre-election mechanism is thus widely criti-
cised as a way for the central government to manipulate electoral results.
Occupation as civil disobedience
As ongoing debates confirm the wide chasm between the kind of electoral
mechanisms Beijing finds acceptable and the full-fledged universal suffrage
demanded by pro-democracy forces, the challenge for the pan-democratic
camp is to find the best negotiating strategy going forward. This is where
Benny Tai Yiu-ting, a law professor at the University of Hong Kong, floated
the idea of staging an act of large-scale civil disobedience (gongmin kang-
ming 公民抗命). To Tai, the fatal flaw in the pan-democrats’ strategy is their
regrettable lack of bargaining power. Aside from using its one-third objection
vote in the Legislative Council to block constitutional proposals, the pro-
democracy camp simply has no “nuclear bomb” at hand to strengthen its
negotiating position vis-à-vis Beijing. Tai believes that Hong Kong citizens
must be willing to deploy “a most destructive weapon” (zuida shashangli
wuqi 最大殺傷力武器). In a January 2013 op-ed, Tai proposed rallying at
least 10,000 citizens to participate in a non-violent sit-in to immobilise
Central should no substantial progress be made by summer 2014. (19) Central
is the financial and commercial heart of Hong Kong and the lifeline of the
city’s prosperity. The idea is to have participants blocking off entire sections
of roads in Central such that traffic will be paralysed and economic activities
will be disrupted. The greater the number of participants, the more difficult
it would be for the police to clear the ground without using force, and the
heavier the political cost for the SAR government. 
What perhaps distinguishes this campaign from previous movements is its
focus on “absolute non-violence” as a way to seize moral authority. It is the
organisers’ belief that the movement can only be successful if the majority
of Hong Kong people sees it as a legitimate form of struggle. In a bid to secure
even the support of conservative members of society, Occupy Central is po-
sitioned as a peaceful demonstration in which violent means of struggle are
ruled out. Participants must take an oath not to use force or resist law en-
forcement, and violators will be ousted from the operation. Notably, to em-
phasise self-sacrifice and the solemnity of the struggle, participants are
encouraged to give themselves up to the authorities after the movement is
over and to file no defence in trial (zhudong zishou bing yu fating buzuo kang-
bian 主動自首並於法庭不作抗辯). They must hence be willing to bear any
legal consequences for breaking the law. Key supporters of the movement
have said they expect “a lot of people will go to jail, a lot of people will lose
their professional qualifications” should arrests take place en masse. (20) Oc-
cupy organisers have initially focused on mobilising the middle-aged and the
middle class: neither strongly supportive of the government nor highly critical
of it, this “silent majority” makes up 50% to 70% of the population.
On 27 March, Benny Tai was joined by his two partners, Sociology Profes-
sor Chan Kin-man and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming of Chai Wan Baptist Church,
at a solemn press meeting during which the movement’s manifesto (xinnian
shu 信念書) was announced. Titled “Let Love and Peace Occupy Central”
(rang ai yu heping zhanling zhonghuan 讓愛與和平佔領中環), the manifesto
highlights three fundamental convictions that participants in the campaign
should share: that the electoral system of Hong Kong must satisfy interna-
tional standards in relation to universal suffrage; that the electoral reform
proposal should be decided by means of a democratic process; and that any
act of civil disobedience, though illegal, must be “absolutely non-violent.” (21)
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Four basic steps of the movement are also outlined: there will first be a
covenant-signing day planned for summer 2013 at which participants will
pledge their commitment to the action; followed by deliberation day
(shangtao ri 商討日) and citizen authorisation (gongmin shouquan 公民授
權), and culminating in the final act of civil disobedience. 
Work is in progress towards producing an electoral reform proposal. De-
liberation days will be held, according to principles of deliberative democ-
racy laid out in the works of American scholars Bruce Ackerman and James
Fishkin, to come up with such a proposal, which will then go through an
electronic voting platform for a citywide vote as an endorsement for the
final plan. It is anticipated that the government will then throw out its own
counter-proposal, one that will likely make partial compromises without
fully complying with the democrats’ demands. At this time, the resignation
of a legislator, possibly that of Democratic Party lawmaker Albert Ho Chun-
yan from his Legislative Council “super seat,” will take place to trigger a by-
election or pseudo-referendum to provide a platform for citizens to express
their support or opposition to the government’s proposed package. (22)
Should the people vote against it but the leadership refuse to budge, the
blockade of Central will go ahead in summer 2014. Smaller-scale non-co-
operative actions will accompany the blockade, such as the draping of SAR
flags across streets for signature collection. (23)
With leaders meeting and plans unfolding, Occupy Central has been gain-
ing momentum since its conception just nine months ago. The first delib-
eration day, attended by 700 participants including 600 invited guests and
100 randomly selected citizens, was successfully held in early June and pro-
duced a list of seven main points to be discussed at the next deliberation
day. (24) The campaign also received a great boost at the annual 1 July march.
Organisers recruited a team of more than 100 volunteers to help collect
donations and advertise the campaign, successfully raising HK$800,000
from supporters. (25) Perhaps a greater boost to the occupy organisers, how-
ever, was simply the increased turnout at the march itself. Civil Human
Rights Front put participation figures at 430,000, an increase from 400,000
in 2012, 218,000 in 2011 and 52,000 in 2010. (26) The trend of growing dis-
content is evident: it is a matter of tactic and will on the part of Occupy
Central activists to capture this popular sentiment and turn it into a polit-
ically-definitive movement.
Reactions to Occupy Central
The reaction of government officials to the campaign is an important in-
dication of how events will likely unfold in the lead-up to summer 2014.
What has happened thus far has only added fuel to the occupy movement.
In a move widely seen as targeted political persecution, in early May a vol-
unteer at the movement’s office was arrested for assisting in the organisa-
tion of an unauthorised assembly at the 1 July demonstration back in
2011. (27) Melody Chan, a 26-year-old trainee solicitor, is a key supporter of
Occupy Central, and her interview with Benny Tai, which she wrote for the
local current affairs blog Independent Media, played a critical role in spread-
ing and popularising the campaign through online channels. (28) Although
the police claimed to be unaware of Chan’s involvement in the campaign,
the fact that the arrest took place almost two years after the alleged offense
was committed invariably raised suspicion that it was politically moti-
vated. (29) Weeks later, chief executive Leung Chun-ying issued his strongest
warning yet to Occupy Central organisers by saying that the government
will not tolerate law-breaking activities. He said that it is impossible for the
movement to be lawful and peaceful, and that organisers are “breaking the
law for the sake of it” (wei fanfa er fanfa 為犯法而犯法). (30)
Pro-establishment figures have quickly aligned their views with that of
the government. These critics have resorted to three main lines of argument.
The first, like Leung’s, is to condemn Occupy Central as unnecessarily radical
and working against the spirit of the law. Wen Wei Po attacked the organ-
isers for “stirring up young professionals to knowingly break the law” (shan-
dong nianqing zhuanye renshi zhifa fanfa 煽動年青專業人士知法犯法).
Legislator Regina Ip alleged that the “real, covert purpose” of the organisers
is to trigger a violent confrontation and unleash the People’s Liberation
Army, “provoking a mini-Tiananmen incident in Hong Kong.” (31) A second
criticism is that the movement sacrifices collective interests for personal
political ambition. Business groups are particularly outspoken on the eco-
nomic losses Occupy Central could incur, citing the concerns of small and
medium enterprises. (32) The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and
the Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong, for example, placed
half-page advertisements condemning the campaign for eroding Hong
Kong’s competitiveness. (33) Economics professor Frances Lui, who compared
Occupy Central to “terrorist” activities, even demanded participants to each
pay a daily punitive fine of HK$160,000 to cover the loss, according to his
estimation, of at least HK$1.6 billion for each day that Central is paral-
ysed. (34) The third criticism is that the campaign lacks broad-based popular
support. (35) This, as we shall discuss, is an issue raised also by concerned
supporters of Occupy Central within the pro-democracy camp.
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The past half of the year saw new activism from Beijing-loyalist organisa-
tions in attacking Occupy Central and rallying citizens to oppose the move-
ment. The more radical of these groups, such as Caring Hong Kong Power
(aihu Xianggang liliang 愛護香港力量 ) and Voice of Loving Hong Kong
(aiGang zhisheng 愛港之聲), were often present at many of the movement’s
key events to cause disruption and sabotage. (36) The movement Defend Cen-
tral (shouhu zhonghuan 守護中環), led by Voice of Loving Hong Kong action
team leader Chan Kwong-man, is also attracting followers through social
network Facebook. The group vowed to launch a Protect Hong Kong move-
ment (huGang xingdong 護港行動) and set up an action team to monitor
the behaviour of Occupy Central activists (jiancha zhanzhong xingdongzu 監
察佔中行動組). It also planned to mobilise 10,000 people to rally in opposi-
tion of Occupy Central as a direct gesture of counteraction. (37)
Schools have again become a major battlefield as fear of the further radi-
calisation of the younger generation prevails: a prestigious local school be-
came the target of acrimonious attacks after it invited Benny Tai to deliver
a lecture, (38) and two secondary schools subsequently withdrew their invi-
tation to Tai. (39) An academic exchange program called “Co-China,” co-hosted
by Occupy organiser Chan Kin-man bringing together participants from Tai-
wan, mainland China, and Hong Kong on the theme of nativist movements,
also received threats that “severe consequences” would follow if the summer
camp were not immediately cancelled. (40) It is apparent that the authorities
fear that Occupy Central will further lead the city’s young people “astray”
by encouraging them to disregard the law through civil disobedience.
There is basis for their growing concern, as Hong Kong is about to see its
first post-colonial generation reaching voting age. Should the city hold its
first direct election for the chief executive then, this first post-colonial gen-
eration will have a powerful influence on the outcome, and this influence
is only going to grow stronger as the older generation, which has much
stronger identification with mainland China and appears less dissatisfied
with the Hong Kong government, passes away. (41) Parents and teachers have
accordingly become the targets of united front efforts. The Central Liaison
Office has reportedly worked through district loyalist organisations to reach
out to parent-teacher associations. The Beijing-friendly Kowloon Women’s
Organisations Federation, for example, was reportedly instructed to hold a
joint meeting with five parent-teacher associations in the Kowloon district
to discuss plans to co-organise a forum preaching the demerits of Occupy
Central, recruiting parents and teachers to help discourage the young from
supporting unlawful activity. The Hong Kong Federation of Education Work-
ers, a pro-government union, praised teachers for being “rational” after its
survey found that 60% of teachers polled said they do not support civil dis-
obedience as a way of making political demands. (42)
Concerns raised by democrats
Within the pro-democracy camp, opinions on Occupy Central are not uni-
formly positive. While most applaud the spirit motivating the movement
and indicate their willingness to participate in it, others have questioned its
practicality and whether the campaign can truly be representative and in-
clusive. One pressing concern is what role Occupy Central will play in ne-
gotiating with the government and whether it will compromise. Surely the
tough lesson learnt by the Democratic Party in the 2009-2010 round of
electoral reform consultation is still fresh in people’s minds: by accepting
closed-door negotiation with the Central Liaison Office and compromising
on a conservative package, the party was labelled a “traitor” and was pun-
ished by voters in the subsequent election. Similarly, when Martin Lee Chu-
ming recently suggested that a nominating committee with a makeup sim-
ilar to the current 1,200-member Election Committee is acceptable if it
guarantees that the five candidates receiving the most nominations (pos-
sibly including one democrat) can enter the popular vote, his idea was
warmly welcomed by government loyalists, but emphatically denounced
by pan-democrats. (43) Lee eventually retracted his comments and apolo-
gised to fellow pan-democrats for “letting them down.” (44)
A second and related concern is this: how much change do Hong Kong
citizens want? Research has found that although there is strong majority
support for fixing the present electoral system, the reform options sup-
ported by the majority are “hardly radical alternatives,” some being “rever-
sions to past practice or extensions of types of elections held in the present
system in new ways.” (45) For example, on the formation of the nominating
committee, nearly half of those polled support making the 1,200-member
Election Committee as it is currently elected into the new nominating com-
mittee. Granted that there is much greater public support for more radical
reform options such as “abolishing all functional constituencies in the Leg-
islative Council” (73%) and “changing the chief executive nominating
process to popular primary system with top two candidates competing in
direct election” (81%), the lack of strong opposition to conservative arrange-
ments is equally suggestive. If Occupy Central is seen by the majority as
making unnecessarily radical demands, it may lose popular support. A poll
conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong
Kong in April sheds further light on this issue. (46) Interviewees were asked
to what extent they support or oppose the following proposal: regarding
the 2017 chief executive election, before candidates enter the one person,
one vote race, there should first be selection within the nominating com-
mittee to ensure that all chief executive candidates will not oppose the Bei-
N o . 2 0 1 3 / 3  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 77
36. Caring Hong Kong Power was established in June 2011 with the stated objective of protecting
the government from attacks by “Hong Kong-harming” political groups and media outlets. The
group’s convener is Chan Ching-sum; see an interview with Chan by Stuart Lau, “Hong Kong full
of ‘political rogues’, says activist Chan Ching-sum,” South China Morning Post, 29 April 2013. The
group’s official page is on Wordpress, http://chkp.org/wordpress/ (accessed on 12 July 2013). Voice
of Loving Hong Kong was formed by businessman Ko Tat-pun in October 2012 with the similar
goal of opposing “forces” that disturb Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity. By April 2013 it had
attracted some 3,000 members with 30 active core members, most being native Hong Kongers.
Its official page is on Facebook, https://zh-hk.facebook.com/voiceoflovinghk (accessed on 12 July
2013).
37. “AiGang zhisheng zuzhi wanren fan zhanzhong” (Voice of Loving Hong Kong mobilizes 10,000 to
oppose Occupy Central), Sing Tao, 27 June 2013, http://news.stnn.cc/hongkong/
201306/t20130627_1907996.html (accessed on 3 July 2013).
38. Caring Hong Kong Power published an essay in Wen Wei Po warning against the “evil” influence
of Occupy Central. “Buneng rang zhanzhong mozhang shenjin xiaoyuan” (We cannot let the evil
hand of Occupy Central enter schools), Wen Wei Po, 24 May 2013,
http://paper.wenweipo.com/2013/05/24/PL1305240007.htm (accessed on 28 June 2013).
39. Tony Cheung, “2 schools back out of Occupy Central talks under pressure: Benny Tai,” South China
Morning Post, 20 June 2013.
40. See the public letter posted by on the summer camp’s website, http://goo.gl/dtIkJ (accessed on
28 June 2013).
41. See the detailed statistical analysis presented in Hong Kong Transition Project, “Constitutional Re-
form in Hong Kong: Round Three,” ibid.
42. “Occupy central lacks teachers’ support,” RTHK English News, 11 June 2013, http://rthk.hk/rthk/
news/englishnews/20130611/news_20130611_56_927934.htm (accessed on 3 July 2013).
43. Joshua But, “Martin Lee pulls controversial plan for Hong Kong chief executive poll reform,” South
China Morning Post, 12 April 2013.
44. “Li Zhuming zhengshi xuanbu shouhui fang’an” (Martin Lee officially retracts his proposal,” Apple
Daily, 11 April 2013, http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/realtime/news/20130411/51341996 (ac-
cessed on 9 July 2013).
45. Hong Kong Transition Project, ibid., p. 133.
46. The research findings are available for download on the website of the Public Opinion Programme,
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/report/mpCEnOCC/index.html (accessed on 9 July 2013).
Karita Kan – Occupy Central and Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong
jing government. This is the screening mechanism proposal widely con-
demned by the democrats. Surprisingly, 44% of those polled expressed sup-
port for the plan in contrast to 35% against. The same poll also asked
interviewees whether they support Occupy Central as a means to fight for
universal suffrage: 51% said they oppose it, double the 25% that indicated
support. A more recent poll conducted by the same programme saw support
for Occupy Central increase to 32% after the 1 July march, but opposition
remains as strong as 46%. (47) Notably, the middle-aged group that organ-
isers had at first sought to draw out remains predominantly opposed to the
movement (See Table 2). 
If these figures can be taken as indicative, then Occupy Central still has a
considerable way to go in establishing broad-based popular support. It is
still seen by many as a radical movement despite its peaceful intentions.
As some critics point out, the movement’s emphasis on middle-class par-
ticipation – based on the rationale that the middle class has less to worry
about in terms of career and finance – has made other social groups such
as the working class and the young feel less involved in the struggle. (48) The
business community is another group whose support Occupy organisers
should actively solicit by addressing their concerns over the campaign’s neg-
ative effect on the city’s investment environment. In this regard, the recent
effort by former Chief Secretary Anson Chan to re-launch Citizens’ Com-
mission on Constitutional Development under the new name of Hong Kong
2020 aims to open a dialogue with the business sector and to enlist its sup-
port for constitutional reform. She believes that many businesspeople sup-
port true democracy as they can see the inefficacy of the current political
system, but they need new channels of communication with the pan-de-
mocratic camp to overcome their isolation from the political debate. (49)
As Benny Tai said, the worst case scenario looming on organisers’ mind is
not that protestors are arrested en masse – this, he believes, would only
provoke public outrage and incite more people to rally against the govern-
ment’s excessive behaviour – but rather the campaign’s demise amidst
widespread criticism from an unsympathetic, unmoved public. A critical
question to ask is whether the people of Hong Kong see themselves as part
of this struggle. Most movements in the city’s past with the strongest ral-
lying power have capitalised on the intense concentration of public anger
on certain government initiatives, be it national education, high-speed rail
construction, or Article 23. They built on common opposition to highly un-
popular policies, took place spontaneously, and gathered momentum rap-
idly, culminating in massive turnouts. Occupy Central, on the other hand,
must unite democracy supporters with different ideas about the extent of
reform needed. There is as yet no concrete government plan to build com-
mon opposition around. Going forward, the movement will need to take on
the demanding task of consensus-building to aggregate demands from so-
ciety and articulate a coherent, well-defined set of objectives that repre-
sents what the movement is fighting for. While the proposals by the Alliance
for True Democracy may serve as a good starting point, the pan-democratic
camp must be prepared for a long fight.
Conclusion
While Hong Kong citizens took to the street to demand democratic
change, chief executive Leung Chun-ying reiterated the SAR government’s
“greatest sincerity and commitment” in launching consultation for the im-
plementation of universal suffrage. (50) The Xinhua report on Leung’s speech
was titled “Government seeks change, maintains stability” – a headline that
probably sums up Beijing’s concern and priority in dealing with the territory
that is becoming more difficult to manage by the day. Making incremental
concessions while delaying genuine reform may no longer guarantee the
stability Beijing so prizes. 
Of course, there are different groups and factions within the leadership,
some with more reformist outlooks than others. Professor Jiang Shigong, an
adviser to the central government, said that the failure to push forward
change would hurt Beijing’s moral image and leave the SAR government in
a deadlocked state. (51) But there has also been a recent spate of conservative
thinking finding outlets in various Party publications, most notably People’s
University law professor Yang Xiaoqing’s controversial paper on the inap-
propriateness of Western constitutionalism for communist China. (52) The
ideological battle within the Party-state is far from settled, and will continue
to have implications on how the leadership reacts to Hong Kong’s demands.
There is no doubt that those concerned about democratic progress in the
mainland will be keeping a watchful eye on how Occupy Central unfolds in
the SAR.
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Support 41% 33% 27%
Half-half 22% 14% 9%
Oppose 31% 44% 54%
Don’t know / 
Hard to say
6% 8% 11%
Source: http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/report/mpCEnOCC/index.html (accessed on 9 July 2013).
Table 2 – Attitude toward Occupy Central by age
group, based on a 3-5 July 2013 survey undertaken
by the Public Opinion Programme of the University
of Hong Kong
